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The Google I decision in a nutshell 
By associated professor Christian Bergqvist, ph.d. University of Copenhagen 
On 18 December, the Commission – finally – published its June 2017 Google decision. It is highly suggested 
reading for the competition law legal community. The decision is noteworthy for its brevity at 216 pages, 
compared to the 518-page Intel decision (2009) 302-page Microsoft decision (2004). While the page count is 
surprisingly low, the significant fine of EUR 2.42 billion carries the weight of EUR 11.22 million per page. 
The decision’s brevity largely results from the reduction of the original four (2010) charges down to one (see 
Recital 63) and that the new charges regarding Android (2015) will come in a separate decision. Thus, 
additional cases (and pages) are looming in the not so distant future. 
The tale of two markets with a vertical link 
The legal foundation of the decision is rather simple, and perhaps too simple. Two markets, both national in 
scope, are involved (Recital 154-263) involving: (a) general searches (horizontal) across the entire internet 
for whatever one enters in the search engine, and (b) comparison shopping that allows users to search for 
specific products/services and compare prices and characteristics across different online retailers. Moreover, 
there is a vertical link between the two as general searches can be used to locate suppliers of comparison 
shopping, and thus be considered upstream.  
General searches are separated (Recital 161-190) from, e.g., (i) content sites as different newsgroups, (ii) 
online sales platforms such as Amazon, (iii) social media such as Facebook, and (iv) specialized searches such 
as www.kayak.com, which focus on travel and provide a vertical search for a specific subject matter. More 
important are general searches totally dominated by Google with an estimated above 90 percent market share 
in most EU countries. Comparison shopping (Recital 191-250) involves a service where users can compare 
products and prices directly on the Google platform instead of visiting different specialized online sites. This 
is a service distinct from (i) online merchant and merchant platforms, such as Amazon and eBay that actually 
sell products, (ii) specialized searches focusing on one subject matter, (iii) online search advertising platforms, 
and (iv) different online retailers. Google is active when it comes to comparison shopping with Google 
Shopping, but not much is offered regarding Google’s market position here. In contrast, much effort is invested 
into explaining how Google dominates the former through strong network and bandwagon effects (Recital 
285-315), thus entrenching Google near monopoly position and making it unlikely to challenge. However, the 
high market share largely follows mechanically from the narrow market definition.   
I have mixed feeling about the rendered markets. I accept that general searches is something different from 
specialized searches, where the former offers a horizontal search across the entire internet and the latter, by 
contrast, offers a vertical search for one specific subject matter. On the other hand, Google Shopping bridges 
the two by allowing one to search for travels and books through a general (horizontal) search negating the need 
to use specialized (vertical) searches. Moreover, even after reading the decision several times, I still fail to 
understand how comparison shopping precisely is separated from general searches, as some of the functions 
are identical. Presumably, this matter will be discussed intensely before the General Court when that time 
comes. 
The theory of harmed advanced by the Commission - A bridge too far? 
The two markets (and ability to separate them) are essential for understanding the theory of harm advanced by 
the Commission. Essentially, this involves how the first market (general searches) is abused to leverage the 
strong market position to the second (comparison shopping). Not only for the purpose of securing control with 
a new (and more profitable) market, but also to prevent the latter from being used as a jumping off point for 
an attack on the former (see Recital 342). The merits of the leverage strategy are not well supported with 
internal documents (save some potential references in Recitals 381, 382, 390 and 643), and thus somewhat 
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open-ended. Legally, of course this is immaterial – as abuse does not require malicious intent (as noted in 
recital 338). However, abuse requires (a) some sort of impediment to competition, and (b) meeting the legal 
requirements defined by the applicable abuse standard.  Herein lies the decision’s potential flaws. Of the 124 
pages devoted to the question of abuse, the bulk explains how Google’s behavior is detrimental to competition 
while (in my opinion) only 11 pages attempt remotely to explain how this meets the relevant legal requirements 
(Recital 331-339, 591-607 and 641-652).  
In my opinion, the Commission never fully explains what legal standard the decision advances, except from 
rebutting that it is a refusal to supply (Recital 650). However, from the submitted arguments (see, e.g., Recitals 
336 and 379) it is clear that the Commission feels that Google demotes searches that do not lead users to 
Google Shopping, and thus exclusionary discriminates. Moreover, this fits perfectly with the leverage strategy 
outlined above, but is more flawed when it comes to explaining how consumers are harmed. Comparison 
shopping is clearly a profitable activity in contrast to general searches, where the Commission has to offer 
some consideration on the matter (see, e.g., Recitals 157-160) making it rather logically why Google might 
attempt to divert traffic. The Commission is clearly not ignorant of this, as references (Recital 159) are made 
to the economics of two sides platforms.  
Discriminatory abuse is unchartered waters 
Of all possible legal standards, discrimination is presumably the most open-ended and unsettled, partly 
explaining why (help me if I have missed one) not a single case is invoked in direct support of the legal 
findings. All the cases cited (see, e.g., pp. 74-76 and 182-183) interprets the general principles of Article 102 
rather than Article 102(c) on discrimination and how it should be applied directly to the case. Moreover, while 
presenting the behavior as discrimination, the word is never used nor are there any references to Article 102(c). 
Of course, case law – including new principles – can be developed. And, in light of the many calculations 
offered in support, the decision is not entirely unfound - provided, of course, the market description holds 
water. Moreover, it is somewhat unusual for the Commission to advance a decision, not to mention doling out 
the biggest fine ever, without having a basket of cases upon which to rely in support of why the demonstrated 
behavior clearly infringes Article 102 and generally accepted commercial practice. Consequently, there is 
much to be discussed before the General Court, including the inconsistencies noted above and some (claimed) 
irregularities in the proceedings (see Recitals 106-144). The latter will most likely haunt the Commission as 
they invoke (Recital 120) in support of its action, the now overturned General Court ruling in Intel.  
It’s doubtful that Google has meet the order to terminate its abuse 
As a side note, the decision (p. 214) orders Google to present a solution to remedy its abuse within 90 days 
from June 2017 that meets defined requirements (summarized in Recital 700). If I understand Google’s 
proposal (submitted in August) correctly, such solution involves securing equal access to displays in Google 
Shopping. However, as detailed above, the abuse does not relate to activities on the market for comparison 
shopping, but instead the upstream market for general searches. I’m therefore inclined to be scepticical on the 
remedies meeting the requirements and find it rather likely we soon will hear about a potential barrage of daily 
fines. 
The decision is available using the link below and I welcome comments on cbe@jur.ku.dk regarding points I 
have missed or misread.  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf 
 
